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Edward Jonathan Lowe was one of the most distinguished metaphysicians of the last 
50 plus years. He made immense contributions to analytic philosophy in as diverse 
areas as metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophical 
logic, history of Modern philosophy (especially on John Locke), and philosophy of 
religion.  
Lowe was a realist metaphysician. Like Aristotle, he thought that, with sustained 
reflection and responsible engagement with empirical research, the nature of a mind-
independent reality can be discovered. In all of his works, Lowe consistently 
maintained that our common-sense pre-philosophical convictions about reality 
should not be ignored unless there is a good reason to do so. Even in such cases, Lowe 
firmly believed that common sense should rather be corrected and further enriched in 
light of relevant empirical discoveries. But Lowe never accepted the idea that, in light 
of the advancement of science, somehow we should entirely stop our reliance on 
common sense in our inquiry into the nature of reality. Partly in defense of this very 
view, Lowe developed his most influential and highly original work: the four-category 
ontology. The gist of this work concerns metaphysics as an inquiry into the structure 
of ultimate reality (taken in general), which provides a foundation for natural science.  
Lowe strongly believed that it is metaphysics, not science that can set the terms for 
what is possible and not possible. Lowe believed that figuring out what actually exists 
in the natural world falls within the purview of science. In Lowe’s view, metaphysics 
and science can and should work in synergy, each playing its distinctive role in 
enhancing our knowledge of a mind-independent reality. Lowe extended his realist 
view of reality to causation, laws of nature, modality, personal identity, logic, 
language, God’s existence, time and space, human ontology, properties, and many 
other issues.  
The impact of Lowe’s work on metaphysics continues to be a subject of immense 
interest to philosophers. For example, in this regard, we can mention some of the 
recent high-level publications on Lowe’s metaphysics, namely: E. J. Lowe and Ontology 
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edited by Miroslaw Szatkowski (Routledge, 2022); Ontology, Modality & Mind: Themes 
from the Metaphysics of E.J. Lowe edited by Alexander Carruth, Sophie Gibb, and John 
Heil (OUP, 2018); Studies in the Ontology of E.J. Lowe edited by Timothy Tambassi 
(Editiones Scholasticae, 2018).  
Lowe’s views on ontological issues also have direct implications for issues in 
philosophical theology as well as a philosophy of religion such as the incarnation, 
trinity, divine attributes, human agency, and divine sovereignty, unified experience and the 
existence of God, divine causation, divine temporality or atemporality, just to mention a few. 
One of the things that makes Lowe’s work uniquely suitable to apply to various issues 
in either philosophical theology or philosophy of religion has to do with its systematic 
nature. Lowe built an extremely sophisticated ontological system as shown in his The 
Four-Category Ontology. In so many ways, Lowe’s highly original ontological system 
will prove relevant to address questions that arise both in philosophical theology and 
in philosophy of religion. Many contemporary metaphysicians who are influenced by 
Lowe's system have an interest to integrate elements of Lowe’s metaphysics in their 
treatment of these questions.  
Yet, to this date, no attempt has been made to take a general look at how Lowe’s 
metaphysics relates to various issues in philosophical theology as well as in 
philosophy of religion. This is the first attempt to take concrete steps to fill in the 
existing gap in this regard. To this effect, each of the papers in this special issue applies 
the relevant aspects of Lowe’s metaphysics and ontology to different theological 
issues.  
In “An Embodied Existence in Heaven and the Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism 
(Revisited)” Alejandro Pérez proposes to imagine, through Lowe’s Non-Cartesian 
substance dualism (NCSD), how it is possible to resurrect. Despite many objections 
raised against the classic conception of eschatology (i.e., the history of end times), 
Pérez argues that there are some reasons to think that a more corporeal conception of 
the eschaton is desirable which he claims is also metaphysically possible. As Pérez 
further shows, a corporeal conception of the eschaton is compatible with biblical data. 
Pérez advances his discussion by exploring what he calls the Christ Body Argument. 
Pérez claims that the Christ Body Argument invites us to reject a disembodied existence 
in heaven. Alternatively, this argument gives us reasons to adopt the corporeal 
existence of Christ in heaven. Pérez claims that a kind of Dualism, that is, one 
possessing Lowe’s NCSD’s virtues, could play a role in exploring this new theological 
option. Pérez considers Lowe’s NCSD as a metaphysical option which he says helps 
us to better understand what we are. Pérez claims that if we hope and believe in the 
resurrection of the dead, Lowe’s NCSD provides us with an interesting model to think 
about it.  
In “Craig’s Anti-Platonism, Lowe’s Universals, and Christ’s Penal Substitutionary 
Atonement”, R. Scott Smith looks at William Lane Craig’s account of nominalism 
which he takes to be a kind of “anti-Platonism.” Scott claims that for Craig, Platonism 
is inimical to God’s aseity (i.e. necessarily self-existent being). Craig, more recently, 
also defended the penal substitution of Christ (i.e., Christ death as a substitute for 




sinners). Scott claims that Craig has not brought the two subjects into dialogue with 
each other. So in this essay, Scott wants to rectify what he thinks is lacking in Craig’s 
work. Scott attempts to do this by exploring the implications of austere nominalism 
and trope theory, for the penal substitution. Scott argues that nominalism undermines 
the penal substitution of Christ. In light of such observations, Scott argues that for 
Craig to preserve both his anti-Platonism and the penal substitution, a better 
alternative is to embrace E. J. Lowe’s immanent universals. 
In “Monarchical Trinitarianism: A Metaphysical Proposal”, Joshua R. Sijuwade 
aims to provide a metaphysical elucidation of a specific model of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. He calls this model Monarchical Trinitarianism. Sijuwade discusses 
Monarchical Trinitarianism, within Lowe’s formal, neo-Aristotelian ontological and 
metaphysical framework. In this regard, Sijuwade focuses on Lowe’s four-category 
ontology and serious essentialism. Sijuwade shows how formulating the Monarchical 
Trinitarianism model through Lowe’s ontological and metaphysical framework will 
enable us to clearly explicate it. Moreover, Sijuwade argues that by applying Lowe’s 
ontological and metaphysical framework, the important 'multiple-natures' problem 
raised against the Monarchical Trinitarianism model can be shown to be ineffective. 
In “The Five-Category Ontology? E.J. Lowe and the Ontology of the Divine”, 
Graham Renz argues that although Lowe was a theistically-inclined philosopher who 
developed and defended a four-category ontology with roots in Aristotle’s Categories, 
he engaged in little philosophical theology. Renz further argues that Lowe said even 
less about how a divine being might fit into his considered ontology. So in this essay, 
Renz explores ways in which the reality of a divine being might be squared with 
Lowe’s ontology. Renz motivates the exploration with a puzzle that forces Lowe to 
reject either divine aseity or the traditional view that God is a substance. Renz shows 
that the puzzle cannot be overcome by rejecting one of its premises. In light of this, 
Renz considers ways in which Lowe might try to reject the puzzle in its entirety. Renz 
argues that the best way to reject the puzzle is to countenance a fifth fundamental 
category which he describes as the category of supernatural substance. 
In “From Murphy’s Christian Physicalism to Lowe’s Dualism”, Mostyn Jones and 
Eric LaRock discuss Nancey Murphy’s physicalism according to which God created 
us as physical beings without immortal souls. Murphy draws her main justification 
for her Christian physicalism from neuroscience, which she claims can better explain 
minds in terms of physical information processing than the problematic dualists’ 
account of nonphysical terms. However, Jones and LaRock argue that Murphy 
overestimates the role of neuroscience and in doing so, unjustifiably underestimates 
dualism. Jones and LaRock further argue that Murphy fails to show how neuroscience 
can explain the features of the mind such as qualia, unity, privacy, and causality. By 
contrast, Jones and LaRock argue that Lowe’s dualism can better explain the features 
of the mind in experimentally testable ways. In light of this, Jones and LaRock argue 
that the inadequacy of Murphy’s physicalism further amplifies the value of Lowe’s 
dualism.  
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In “Metaphysics, Natural Science and Theological Claims: E. J. Lowe’s Approach”, 
Mihretu P. Guta discusses Lowe's view of the synergy between metaphysics and 
natural science. In doing so, he extends Lowe’s synergistic model to develop a realist 
account of theological claims thereby responding to Peter Byrne’s strong form of 
eliminativism and agnosticism about theological claims. Guta begins his discussion 
with Lowe’s view of metaphysics in which he shows how Lowe thinks metaphysics 
and natural science are related. After responding to objections against Lowe’s 
conception of metaphysics, Guta discusses the implications of Lowe’s conception of 
metaphysics for a realist account of theological claims. He ends his discussion by 
claiming that there are excellent reasons to extend the synergy between metaphysics 
and natural science to that of theology as well. 
Finally, in “E. J. Lowe and Divine Causal Agency”, Gregory E. Ganssle applies 
Lowe’s theory of rational agency to God’s causal activity. Ganssle argues that Lowe’s 
account fits well the traditional notions that God acts in the world for reasons. In 
contrast to Lowe’s analysis of human causal agency, Ganssle argues that in the divine 
case, reasons for acting are not constituted by needs. Rather reasons for acting are 
constituted by God’s desires or plans. As Ganssle sees it, the fit between Lowe’s 
account of causal agency and the contours of divine causal agency motivates an 
argument in favor of Lowe’s theory of rational agency. Ganssle ends his essay by 
claiming that any philosopher who is a theist ought to think Lowe’s account is likely 
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